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The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor 
Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing 
the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global 
politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects 
and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is 
organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of 
European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s 
neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The Policy Paper Series of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies complements its Working 
Papers Series. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a group on a particular policy 
matter, specifically in the field of European integration. 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies are not 
responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author(s). 
The aim of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is to contribute to the public debate by 
offering views and opinions on matters of general interest. 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at 
a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider global 
developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and efforts to 
undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute (EUI) wants to 
highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at this juncture as a 
contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider programme on the elections 
including the development of a Voting Advice Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an 
online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting either in their country of 
citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman Centre’s 
European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 2018, the 
Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on the European 
Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. The EGPP also 
promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, including blog 
debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
  
Abstract 
The most competitive economies in the European Union (EU) spend more on social policy and public 
services than the less successful ones. 21st century knowledge economies and ageing societies require 
European welfare states to focus as much – if not more – on ex-ante social investment capacitation than 
on ex-post social security compensation. While poverty mitigation through inclusive minimum income 
protection ‘buffers’ remains a prerequisite for any effective social investment strategy, by exempting 
human capital ‘stock’ investments from the Stability Pact, for the eurozone, the E(M)U can deliver on 
the promise of the 2017 European Pillar of Social Rights (2017) and recoup its existentially important 
future-oriented upward convergence momentum. 
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1. Re-engaging Europe’s double commitment 
A decade after the first crisis of 21st century capitalism, Europe has passed the nadir of the aftershocks 
unleashed by the 2008 global downturn. It is time to count blessings: a rerun of the Great Depression 
has been avoided and growth returned to the besieged continent. Whether the upswing will continue in 
2019 is doubtful as dark clouds hover on the horizon. The spectre of deglobalization looming over trade 
tensions between the United States (US) and China, the uncertain fallout from Brexit, Hungarian, Polish 
and Romanian backsliding on the rule of law, and the rise of populism across the continent confront the 
European Union (EU) with an existential crisis. Across the eurozone, (youth) unemployment remains 
very high, especially in the economies most adversely affected by the Great Recession. The recent 
standoff between the European Commission and Italy’s Eurosceptic government of Cinque Stelle and 
the Lega over its fiscal stimulus commitment, together with the gilets jaunes backlash against President 
Macron’s reform momentum in France, also demonstrate that the eurozone predicament is far from over.  
The EU’s post-crisis fall from grace as an even-keeled project of regional economic cooperation 
committed, in the words of the Lisbon Treaty, to a ‘social market economy’ fostering economic 
prosperity and social solidarity in tandem within and between member states has deepened Eurosceptic 
discontent and welfare chauvinism and increased support for xenophobic and right-wing populism 
across the continent. Can Europe’s unique ‘double commitment’ to inclusive social citizenship at the 
level of the nation state and progressive economic integration on the European plane be rescued in the 
years ahead? Is there political room for a more assertive social reform agenda bolstered by eurozone 
policy instruments to countenance the ‘efficient market hypothesis,’ which was falsified by the 2008 
financial crash, and the equally threadbare protectionist populist backlash? 
The good news, based on the eurocrisis management experience of the past decade, is that when the 
going gets really tough, as it did in the aftermath of the Greek near-default in 2010, eurozone member 
states, including Hanseatic ones, agree to intrusive measures by the European Financial Stability Facility 
to keep the single currency afloat, with conditional fiscal support for Ireland, Portugal and Greece, 
backed up, with some delay, by unorthodox ECB monetary policy interventions with Mario Draghi at 
the helm. Other good news is that, despite ongoing duress, three quarters of the citizens inhabiting the 
eurozone continue to favour the twenty-year-old single currency. 
Untried policy ideas are never expedient, but they become relevant when unanticipated political 
contingencies press status-quo-breaking politics. Any problem-solving search for a more balanced 
European socioeconomic governance regime should start with a proper diagnosis of the 2008 crash and 
its unexpected spillover into the eurozone crisis. My contention on this score is that Europe’s most 
successful feat of mid-twentieth century social engineering – the national welfare state, a brainchild of 
the Great Depression – has been wrongly (but unsurprisingly) left in cognitive disregard in the prevailing 
diagnoses. The ‘structural reform’ mantra of labour market deregulation, social protection retrenchment, 
pension privatization and social service liberalization ruled the waves of eurozone financial crisis 
management, widening divergence rather than nurturing upward convergence across the besieged 
continent. 
The overwhelming evidence that the more active – big spending – welfare states of north-western 
Europe were best able to absorb the economic and social aftershocks of the global credit crunch, and the 
eurozone conundrum that followed, should be the launching pad for exploring effective and legitimate 
post-crisis eurozone and domestic reform complementarities. Building on recent proposals to reinforce 
a joint-insurance capacity for the Eurozone (Section 2), together with an analysis of welfare state 
resilience in times of adverse demography and the knowledge economy (Section 3), this policy brief 
proposes to ratchet up domestic social investment reform through tangible eurozone fiscal support in 
order to re-engage Europe’s double commitment to economic prosperity and social progress by 
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exempting human capital ‘stock’ investments from the Stability and Growth Pact for a decade or more 
(Section 4).  
2. The half-return of the master 
A decade ago when the first signs of the global financial crisis reached Europe they did not cause 
immediate anxiety. In the aggregate, the European economy was in relatively good shape, with overall 
sound public finances, low inflation and gradually rising levels of employment across the continent. 
However, soon Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain had to salvage a great many 
‘too big to fail’ international banks and insurance companies which were heavily implicated in the US 
credit bubble that burst with the fall of Lehman Brothers. Overnight increases in public deficit and 
national debt could only be restored, European leaders agreed, by sobering up welfare provision. After 
the Greek fiscal crisis threatened to break up the euro, the mantra of fiscal irresponsibility and the 
imperative of welfare retrenchment from the 1980s was reinforced with a vengeance.  
Despite critical differences between the real economy stagflation crises of the 1980s and the financial 
crisis of 2008, the austerity reflex irrespectively prevailed in the EU’s crisis response. And this was not 
simply a matter of generals being biased towards fighting previous wars rather than the ones they are 
confronted with today. Tragically, the austerity reflex took quasi-permanent precedence in the EU 
Treaties. As the single market and the single currency were negotiated at a time when the ‘supply side’ 
revolution in economic theory was riding high, the architects of the Treaties naively believed that the 
Single European Act (SEA), Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the associated Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) would inescapably force member states to keep their ‘wasteful’ welfare states in 
check. It has been argued, among others by Fritz Scharpf (1999) and Maurizio Ferrera (2005), that the 
intricate connection between free movement in the internal market and, for the eurozone, budgetary 
rules setting limits to discretionary fiscal reflation in times of demand-deficient unemployment in effect 
undermines the counter-cyclical capacities of national welfare states to preserve inclusive social 
protection. In addition, the nominal 3 percent deficit rule and the 60 percent debt ceiling flatout prevent 
policy-makers from distinguishing between public consumption outlays and public investments in the 
long-term health of the economy. All public spending – which in rational-expectation macroeconomics 
drains the private sector – is equally bad. 
That the Great Recession did not end in a real depression as in the 1930s is to be attributed to two 
factors. Most importantly, in the first place, is the fact that over the previous quarter century many 
European countries had ventured welfare reform strategies to accommodate their social programmes to 
the new economic and demographic realities of the 21st century, with a proactive and reconstructive 
intent to raise employment in a gender- and age-balanced fashion. Second, by stealthily breaching the 
doctrines enshrined in European treaties, when the time was nigh member state governments did 
ultimately together come to the rescue, backed by the heterodox quantitative easing effort of an assertive 
ECB.  
For decades, government intervention in the economy had been considered detrimental to dynamism 
and growth, but since 2008 the post-war ‘mixed economy’ has come back as a real blessing (Rajan, 
2010). State interference proved indispensable for financial and economic stability and maintaining 
employment. In the recent literature, the revival of the mixed economy has been referred to as the ‘return 
of the master’ – John Maynard Keynes – whose macroeconomic teachings were largely forgotten during 
the long era of market liberalization starting in the 1980s (Skidelsky, 2010). However, I view the recent 
rekindling of Keynesian monetary policy, together with prudent financial market re-regulation, as a mere 
‘half-return of the master.’ Ten years after the crisis, it is about time to reinvigorate the deeper 
socioeconomic objectives of full employment and social protection at the heart of Keynesian 
macroeconomics.  
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According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index, the most 
competitive European economies are high-spending welfare states, including Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, with levels of social spending hovering between 25 per cent and 30 per cent 
of GDP. At a minimum, the evidence that high social spending correlates with competitiveness, high 
employment and low (child) poverty presses us to consider the quality rather than the quantity of social 
spending when trying to better understand the relation between welfare provision and socioeconomic 
wellbeing in rich democracies. It is not at all surprising that the countries best able to absorb the 
economic and social aftershocks of the financial crisis were the more inclusive welfare states in 
northwest Europe. They allowed universal social security provision to ‘buffer’ the macro-economy at 
large and household incomes at the micro-level in hard times, exactly as Keynes and Beveridge foresaw 
in the 1930s and 1940s. But successful welfare states today do more than simply ‘buffer’ a recession 
following a deep financial crisis, as I will explicate below.  
A second implication that would follow from a ‘fully fledged return of the master’ is that the greater 
cross-national heterogeneity of the enlarging eurozone, which bars the option of country-specific 
devaluation, is best supported by a joint-insurance capacity to reinforce the potential benefits of deeper 
European economic integration (Schelkle, 2018). Historically, this road was not taken for reasons of 
1980s cognitive inertia. By constitutionally committing the union to the no-bailout principle in fiscal 
policy and the lowflation prerogative in monetary policy, the architects of post-1989 European economic 
integration deemed that convergence was best served by disciplining member states to individually self-
contain the moral hazard predicaments produced by their hefty national welfare states. The eurozone 
crisis critically exposed the naïve policy belief in deepening European economic interdependence 
without providing for an effective safety net. Thus, while the new eurozone members in central and 
eastern Europe have been able catch up, since the onslaught of the financial crisis the northern core and 
the southern periphery have diverged dramatically in terms of socioeconomic fortunes and with respect 
to real wages, income per capita, employment, productivity, investment, relative poverty and 
redistribution.  
Given that inclusive welfare states are far more robust at buffering asymmetric shocks than any 
banking resolution instrument discussed today under a Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union, 
many economists and policy makers, among whom ex-commissioner Laszlo Andor and former Belgian 
social affairs minister Frank Vandenbroucke, are proposing a kind of ‘re-insurance scheme’ for national 
unemployment insurance systems to provide fiscal breathing space for countries asymmetrically 
affected by a possible downturn (Beblavy et al., 2015; Dullien, 2014; Andor, 2016; Vandenbroucke, 
2017; Vandenbroucke et al., 2017). A eurozone common re-insurance facility acting as an automatic 
stabilizer is indeed fully consistent with a ‘full return’ of the master. I agree with Andor and 
Vandenbroucke’s focus on the eurozone, as indeed the overriding – Keynesian – lesson from the 
European experience of the Great Recession was the non-availability of a policy instrument for eurozone 
shock absorption. An added cognitive advantage to this proposal, furthermore, is its intimate affinity 
with arguments about the Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union, which are also increasingly 
framed as eurozone re-insurance devices, not least by Mario Draghi (2018). 
However, a eurozone facility to reinsure national social insurance systems is difficult to follow 
through. First of all, against the background of popular national welfare states, a pan-European or 
eurozone-wide insurance device tied to contributory obligations and other behavioural constraints is not 
readily politically legitimated. The myth of national welfare state sovereignty runs deep. A more 
practical second problem is that, as Vandenbroucke (2017) concedes, any effective eurozone social re-
insurance facility impinges on the variegated design of national unemployment insurance systems, 
especially with regard to the extent to which the prevailing social security systems are able to buffer 
large cohorts in the working-age population. There is a need for some minimal institutional convergence 
in the scope and operational routines of national social insurance systems for a smooth Keynesian 
operation of the envisaged eurozone unemployment re-insurance, touching on social security coverage, 
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activation, minimum wages and income protection for households with weak attachments to the labour 
market.  
A more fundamental problem, third, is that social insurance typically protects insiders rather than 
outsiders. From the perspective of contemporary politics, the EMU social re-insurance top-up may prove 
to be an effective device in the event of future asymmetric shocks. As such, however, it does not address 
the problematic socioeconomic divergence that has been unleashed by the eurocrisis and its neoliberal 
(mis-)management. From the perspective of current social imbalances, arguably, outsiders, ranging from 
youngsters, women and the long-term unemployed, rather than labour market insiders, have 
disproportionately borne the brunt of the social aftershocks of the crisis. Mario Monti is purported to 
have labelled the EU the “trade union of the next generation.” Today, the EU – and especially the 
eurozone – is not doing a very good job for the next generation. 
3. Taking social investment seriously 
Central to the long-term financial sustainability of the welfare state are the number (quantity) and 
productivity (quality) of current and future employees and taxpayers. To the extent that welfare policy 
in a knowledge economy is geared towards maximizing employment, employability and productivity, 
this helps to sustain the so-called ‘carrying capacity’ of the modern welfare state. With the massive 
expansion in women’s employment over the past quarter century, the work-income-family nexus is very 
much the ‘lynchpin’ of the social investment paradigm (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). More flexible 
labour markets and skill-biased technological change, but also higher divorce rates and single-
parenthood, make equal access to employment for women (economic independence) a prerequisite. In 
the absence of possibilities of externalizing child and elderly care, rising numbers of female workers 
face ‘broken careers’ and postponed motherhood, resulting in lower fertility and thereby intensifying 
the ageing burden on pensions and healthcare. Policies such as early child education and care (ECEC), 
education and training over the life-course, (capacitating) active labour market policies (ALMP) and 
work-life balance (WLB) policies like (paid) parental leave, flexible employment relations and work 
schedules, lifelong learning (LLL) and long-term care (LTC) all share objectives that transcend the 
compensatory logic of income-support, which was originally developed to protect (predominantly male) 
workers and their (stable) families against market exigencies. The social investment approach tilts the 
welfare balance to social risk prevention rather than compensation in times of economic or personal 
hardship. The core idea of social investment is that it is better to prepare than to repair, i.e. to assist 
individuals in adapting to the new risks associated with deindustrialisation, globalisation and the 
feminisation of employment. The objective is to increase human capital in quantity and quality in order 
to adapt the labour force to a period when demographic and technological changes accelerate. 
Figure 1 surveys a selection of 22 EU countries and the US in terms of their employment rates and 
levels of equality after taxes and transfers (we use the reverse Gini index), while also giving an idea of 
the size of each country’s welfare state in terms of public social spending (the larger the surface circle, 
the ‘bigger’ the welfare state). The long-cherished notion of a trade-off between economic efficiency 
and social equality does not seem to apply to many advanced 21st century economies. If anything, it 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule, with the US and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom 
(UK) – two compact ‘liberal’ welfare states – displaying relatively high (though not the highest) 
employment levels but performing poorly in terms of equality. By contrast, the countries showing record 
employment levels, which are among the bigger welfare spenders, successfully reconcile high levels of 
both equality and employment. The encompassing welfare states of northern Europe, with the partial 
exception of Finland, attain level employment well above the 70 per cent Lisbon target (dashed line). 
The same is true for the continental countries, Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic, which have 
caught up rapidly in the last decade. Certainly, employment-equity success does not hold for all the large 
European welfare states. Some big welfare spenders, such as France and Belgium, continue to be 
confronted with a ‘welfare without work’ trap: they do seemingly well in terms of redistribution but 
have failed to raise employment levels. More worryingly, southern European countries (especially Italy, 
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Greece and Spain, although the latter made progress before the crisis and today seems on the road to 
recovery) fall short of both objectives: they face low employment and high levels of inequality despite 
sizeable welfare spending (Hemerijck and Ronchi, forthcoming). 
Figure 1. Employment rate, equality and the ‘size’ of the welfare state in the US and in selected 
European countries (year 2015). 
 
Note: The size of the bubbles in the graph is proportional to welfare spending in each country, ranging from the 
‘smaller’ welfare state in Latvia (14.4 per cent of the GDP) to the ‘biggest’ in France (31.7 per cent of the GDP). 
The dashed line indicates the Lisbon employment target (raising the employment to or above 70 percent). 
Source: OECD. 
Three complementary policy functions underpin the social investment edifice: (1) raising and 
maintaining the ‘stock’ of human capital and capabilities; (2) easing the ‘flow’ of contemporary labour 
market and life-course transitions; and (3) using ‘buffers’ such as income protection and economic 
stabilization as inclusive safety nets. Aggregate evidence on welfare performance – before and after the 
crisis – corroborates the effectiveness of social investment: countries with strong and integrated 
portfolios of ‘stock,’ ‘flow’ and ‘buffer’ policies are best able to reconcile economic competitiveness 
and social inclusion (Hemerijck, 2017). Evidently, the human capital ‘stock’ function features most 
prominently in the social investment perspective. By comparison, the post-war Keynesian-Beveridgean 
welfare state prioritised social protection ‘buffers’ more, while the conservative-liberal critique of the 
interventionist welfare state of the 1980s gave primacy to ‘flow,’ understood as efficient labour market 
allocation, that is to say, undistorted by the ‘moral hazard’ predicament of welfare benefits and job 
protection regulation. In the social investment perspective, the relationship between the functions of 
‘stock,’ ‘flow’ and ‘buffer’ is not only more intimate; each of the three functions individually take on a 
specific substantive disposition. In the social investment paradigm, ‘buffers’ are required to undergird 
far more volatile and precarious labour markets, and also to cover periods of training and more gendered 
childrearing and care obligations towards frail family members. As such, the substantive emphasis is on 
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‘inclusive’ income protection rather than employment-related social security for labour market insiders. 
Similarly, while ‘flows’ in the conservative-liberal critique are premised on lean social protection and 
indiscriminately deregulated labour markets, to ensure optimal market flexibility, satisfactory ‘flows’ in 
the social investment perspective are inherently related to ‘work-life balance’ and ‘family reconciliation’ 
requirements, which entails an element of (re-)regulation of (gendered) employment relations. Finally, 
human capital ‘stock’ exigencies in both the Keynesian-Beveridgean welfare state and the conservative-
liberal welfare state have not reached much beyond compulsory primary and secondary education. In 
contrast, the ‘stock’ effort in the social investment paradigm embraces a ‘lifelong’ commitment to 
human capital acquisition from early childhood to old age. It follows that for social investment to work, 
effective policy coordination is essential. Inclusive ‘buffers,’ gender-balanced ‘flows’ and lifelong 
‘stocks’ can produce mutually reinforcing synergetic effects over the life cycle in terms of aggregate 
economic performance and more individual social wellbeing.  
4. Exempting social investment ‘stock’ spending from the SGP 
My concrete proposal is to discount social investment policies from the fiscal criteria of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Fiscal Compact in order to create the necessary fiscal space, within a 
band of 1 to 2 per cent of GDP, for the coming decade. Reasoning on the three policy functions of social 
investment in terms of a viable division of responsibilities between the EU and the member states, 
clearly the function of social security ‘buffers,’ the core prerogative of the national welfare state, 
jealously guarded by domestic political actors, should remain in the remit of national welfare provision. 
The ‘flow’ function, concerning labour market regulation and collective bargaining in synch with work-
life balance, gender equality and family-friendly employment relations, is best served by mutual learning 
and monitoring processes of open coordination, engaging national administrations, relevant EU expert 
committees and social partners in sharing practices – good and bad – for reform inspiration. This leaves 
us with the overriding importance of the social investment ‘stock’ option. The eurozone austerity reflex 
resulted in a public investment strike, most unfortunately in the area of human capital stock capabilities, 
lifelong education, training and healthcare, with significant negative spillovers for future growth, 
employment and productivity in knowledge economies facing adverse demographics. It is here that the 
EU should press its formidable weight without trespassing on national welfare state jealousies.  
Granting more fiscal room (within bounds) to countries that experience excessive social and 
macroeconomic imbalances would enable them to secure future-oriented financing of their lifelong 
education, skill upgrading and social care systems before the ageing predicament becomes truly 
overwhelming. Exempting such investments from SGP deficit requirements would provide member 
states that opt for social investment reform with an enlarged fiscal space, and without trampling on 
eurozone fiscal rules. For countries struggling to commit to a balanced budget without abandoning their 
‘buffering’ social protection commitments, such exemptions could foster immediate gains in early 
childhood, female employment, improved work-life balance and reduced levels of early school leaving, 
with positive medium-term outcomes in employment growth, productivity through higher educational 
attainment and ultimately a lower pension burden resulting from higher levels of employment.  
Because any human capital upgrading strategy often takes a generation to fully reap the anticipated 
returns, I propose making a decade-long commitment to this political strategy. I am therefore not talking 
about some under-specified discretionary fiscal wiggle-room for countries in budgetary difficulties on 
a year-to-year basis, in agreement with communications on flexibility in EU fiscal governance from the 
Commission (2017). Given its substantive ambivalence, politically, the current flexibility clause is 
already looked upon with suspicion by some of the more fiscally austere Hanseatic member states. 
Moreover, as my proposal concerns a concrete commitment to human capital ‘stock’ improvement, it is 
more easily monitored and, as a consequence, more likely to also engender stronger member-state 
legitimacy for EU action, also because it is specific focus on young generations and families. In times 
of resurgent national welfare chauvinism, domestic reform ownership is crucial. This is why the reform 
initiative lies with national political actors. Italy and Spain could, inter alia, opt for the immediate 
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creation of (primarily female) jobs by making major investments in high quality childcare centres, while 
France would be able to pursue a radical improvement of its system of vocational education and training 
based on the German example, and Belgium, the Netherlands and Slovenia could ramp up their rather 
regressive lifelong learning arrangements following the Finnish model.  
For the Italian conundrum that I referred to in the introduction, it is tragic to concede in hindsight 
that if the social investment support facility had been available for the Letta, Renzi and Gentiloni 
administrations significant investment in social infrastructure would have been underway with 
considerable reform pride and ownership, leveraging (female) employment gains in particular with 
endogenous economic growth. Barring that option, Italy today is left with a populist government that 
ramps up passive consumption spending to restore growth, but we know that old-style Keynesian fiscal 
reflation no longer suffices in knowledge economies and ageing societies, where investment in younger 
generations sustains pensions in the long run and popular welfare states more generally. Admittedly, the 
Italian predicament of low (female) employment and high poverty has home-grown roots. However, 
protracted stagnation in the aftermath of the financial crash is intimately related to how the euro crisis 
which came to a head in 2012 panned out differently compared to other European welfare states. This 
being the case, a corrective effort is imperative. 
It goes without saying that discounting human capital ‘stock’ investments will have to be closely 
monitored through the European Semester in terms of effective open coordination with regard to labour 
market regulation and employment relations that help ease labour market and life course ‘flows’ for 
individuals and families, together with progress towards making social security ‘buffers’ more 
‘inclusive’ across the member states. As such, closely monitored eurozone social investment aid is likely 
to contribute to progressive institutional convergence across the ‘stock’ and ‘flow’ functions of the new 
welfare state. This could ultimately pave the way for layering a reinsurance of national social security 
systems, as advocated by Laszlo Andor and Frank Vandenbrouke, to further reinforce the overall 
resilience of the monetary union. Finally, to the extent that, over time, the eurozone would acquire a 
credible social dimension, this would surely be attractive to (young) voters in central and eastern Europe 
who now merely tolerate illiberal autocracy because of a lack of an inspiring alternative. 
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